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Pp. 316.
A subject with such infinite variety of bearings as Ethics easily
lends itself to different modes of treatment. Every phase of
human development, every department of history, every aspect
of man's life, gives to morality a peculiar point of departure. A
complete ethics presupposes an exhaustive study of human
nature in each and all its elements. Now psychology claims
chief importance as an ethical discipline, now sociology; one
philosopher sublimates morality into a metaphysical formula,
another dissipates it into a social organism; here, it rises
up into religion, and there, it is indistinguishable from law.
There is room for all, if they are not exclusive; and there is need
of a patient and comprehensive thinker if they are not to become
dogmatically incomplete.
The present essay professedly shirks the main ethical question.
Morality, as the author remarks, is a matter of self-adjustment,
and individual effort can alone lead morality to progress (p. 257).
The deepest root of morality lies in respect for our own personality
("individuality" Mr. Taylor quaintly calls it). The true source
of good as of evil lies in the individual disposition of each political
unit (p. 293). And as the source of all conduct is really there,
so the highest type of moralisation lies in acquiring such an
abstract basis of principle as makes a man a spontaneous and
independent fountain of justice and goodness, not a mere channel
through which runs a public and common beneficence. Yet
though this is admitted, it is not in that direction that Mr.
Taylor's investigations proceed. He finds this abstract idealism
too good for human nature's daily food, and moral philosophers
with their categorical duty have dwelt upon it to the extent of
ignoring topics of greater practical and scientific interest.
Nor is Mr. Taylor a stranger to the theories which rest moral
distinctions on certain instincts, senses, faculties and intuitions.
Such instincts he adduces in large numbers. There are altruistic
instincts in man just as there are egoistic appetites; there are
germs of morality exhibited in sexual and parental love; there
are indwelling instincts of order and self-government; jets of
self-sacrifice penetrate the rock of selfishness; and a conviction
that the rule of self-assertion would turn hie into a chaos gives
to the individual mind an eternal measure of right and wrong
(p. 159). Morality has an intuitive force : conscience and moral
sense raise their voice in the human mind.
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426 CRITICAL NOTICES :
There is, then, a moral sense; but it is not universal (p. 196),
and it does not afford sufficient guidance for conduct even in
those whom it inhabits. The problem which Mr. Taylor sets
himself to solve is to consider how, in fact, the world of right,
the rule of justice, has been established; how the majority has
come to recognise and obey, at least in a sort of way, the moral
intuition and "prophetic promptings" of its more gifted leaders.
For—so he states his case—morality originates in the sporadic
phenomenon, occurring now and again, of instincts of self-sacrifice
and respect for others, which, through a favourable conjunction
of circumstances, have, by an alliance with political power, suc-
ceeded in enforcing general submission to their dictates. Not in
every people has morality been so invested with large authority.
There are slow, unprogressive races which have never got beyond
fossilised institutions, containing no germ of advance; and with
such the question of ethical evolution has nothing to do. The
student of the genesis of morals turns his attention to the ad-
vancing races which hand on one from another the torch of
morality to the present day and to its most moralised com-
munities.
But the morality which is thus fostered and handed down is
not the morality of the individual—the ideal of the perfectionist
or of the utilitarian. It is not the problem of self-adjustment
we have to study, but of social adjustment and re-adjustment.
It is the institution of right, law, justice,—the organisation of
the medium in which morality may flourish,—the problem of
Hobbes, in short, and not the problem of Kant, which Mr. Taylor
hopes to solve. How does the fundamental idea of right—respect
for the " individuality" of others—become a reality and not a
mere faculty amongst other possibilities ? For such possibilities
are numerous.
To his own contributions on this point Mr. Taylor gives the
misleading title of the " Antagonistic Theory of Morals," and he
describes the morality he considers as the " morality of nations,"
i.e., the morality which has its sphere of operation in the relation
between man and man in those combinations that are called
"nations". The abstract expression of such relations (and of
these alone) constitutes the morality of which he speaks. It is
his own admission that morality arose only when antagonism
gave way to the principle of self-repression and accommodation :
that morality (by which, of course, is always meant right) is
combination, or, to speak more correctly, the terms and con-
ditions of combination. But that does not hinder Mr. Taylor
from stating that " morality is the result of destructive anta-
gonism," and that " antagonism is the central fact from which
a moral theory has to start". He complains that moral philo-
sophers have not done their duty by the phenomenon of war.
They pass lightly by its horrors, and they offer no explanation of
its origin and function. No doubt the moralist pur sang no more
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discusses the institution of war than he questions the legitimacy
of the family-tie. But the moral philosopher who rises to the
height of his great argument has never failed to point out the
necessary function of the god of battles in a world like ours,
where offences must needs come. What Mr. Taylor's explana-
tion amounts to is as follows. The first tendency of all organic
beings is towards antagonism (p. 214). Mere proximity is a
sufficient reason for contest. The dominance of the fighting
instinct seems to throw into the shade even the supposed primary
appetite towards self-preservation; and the latent tendency to-
wards happiness which, as evolutionists are good enough to
assume, governs the course of human progress in history stands
only second as a conscious principle to the terrible instinct of
antagonism. Conflict or antagonism is what is called in certain
circles a law. It is true that self-sacrifice is also called a law.
But trifles like these which suggest at least two legislations—two
planes of human life—need not detain us. Sufficient be it to
know that Evolution (the modern word for what old-fashioned
people call Nature or God) equipped her organisms for the needs
of their selfish life with a boundless stock of antagonistic spirit.
I t is a mild way of describing the state of affairs which would
arise in these circumstances to say that it was a period in which
there was " no family-cohesion". Yet it may be doubted if our
author means to be seriously taken at his word. Such "cohesion"
in some degree or other can never have been absent altogether ;
but it may be that its early effects were fitful, vague and
transient. There was a little altruism—a little respect for the
rights of others—in the world; but its security could not be
counted on. Antagonism, thus unchecked by fear, would not
allow the seeds of right to grow : it was destructive of all justice
and beneficence. Its action, so long as thus misdirected, was
a curse to man, and the moralised world remained only the
dream of a few enthusiasts, who, sometimes daring boldly to be
altruistic before it 'paid,' fell victims to the toils of rival
selfishness.
The problem, then, is to bind the demon of antagonism, not
to destroy him, but by judicious manipulations to convert him
from the foe into the friend of man, to transform antagonism to
emulation in the service of love. The germ of morality in the
family-relationships—frail and fleeting as they were—had to be
developed; and " when evolution tended to the formation and
consolidation of families, civilisation and morality were assured ".
What, then, led to the formation of that social organism, which
our essayist, with strange oblivion of certain animal societary
forms, pronounces an anomaly ? For in the formation of a com-
munity wielded by one authority—what Mr. Taylor calls a
" nation," and what many have lately learned to call a ' State'—
lies the secret. Antagonism, which unchecked is a curse, is
turned into a, comparative blessing by nationalising it. National
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war is the safety-valve by which the superfluous energies of
antagonism are turned off so as to leave the instincts of right
room to develop inside the limits of the nation. Hostility thus
turned off on other nations, the law of antagonism, we are told,
so changed its form as to reverse its original effects. It is diffi-
cult to attach any meaning to the literal phrase; but it is pro-
bably a paradoxical way of announcing that when the temptation
to selfishness was removed, when violent egoism was no longer
allowed free play, then other " instincts " wrought out the good
work of justice and undid the mischief of the pure spirit of
hatred. With the institution of a single control, individuals were
able to look at each other with indifference.
Thus the warrior and the conqueror are helps to the moral
progress of the world. Indirectly, because they concentrate in
their military mission the bad blood of rivalry which used to
burst out everywhere, and leave others, freed from the feverish
taint, to pursue higher and in especial moral ends. Directly,
because the spirit of conquest and warlike efficiency communi-
cates a sympathetic stimulus to all ranges of activity in the
nation; the conquering spirit is not alien to the progressive; and
a strong national self-consciousness is a condition of individual
greatness. It is in such a community under political sovereignty
that right can exist: only as constituted by the relations esta-
blished between the members of it does morality have a local
habitation and substantial being. Whether any further develop-
ments of morality and right are possible will appear in the
sequel.
But how is such a consummation brought about ? What, in
short, is the relation of morality to force ? for that is the question
which moral science has to solve: How does might stand to
right ? On the priority of force Mr. Taylor has no doubts what-
ever. He has already given expression to his belief that the
family affords no sufficient basis for the political control principle:
unless we suppose that on rare occasions the family is obliged to
close its ranks in the serried phalanx which befits war against
other families. He is no less contemptuous of the theory of
Maine, that law is in large part the growth of peaceful and spon-
taneous custom—the work of a community gradually finding out
the conditions of social stratification. Indeed, on his original
assumption of atomic human beings, destitute of the least patch
of social glue, it is impossible that any other source of social
unification can be adduced than the casual preponderance of some
one man. The origin of unity, national or political (the two
terms are interchangeable), is violence—force. Custom, peace-'
fully developed, is a spurious .procedure, of which the right-minded
evolutionist is ashamed: he prefers a sudden and erratic invasion.
Changes in social condition are the result of accident; and up
rises controlling power. It was but a chance that man spoke—
he might never have used his vocal chords; it was a chance that
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he became moral, for he was so seamed by selfishness; and it
was an accident that made him the ' political animal'.
Mr. Taylor describes at some length the main features of the
reign of force. At first it stood in all the nakedness of violent
might. Im Anfang war die Tliat—the deed of violent usurpation.
Without it the bondless multitude would vegetate on in aimless-
ness,—eating, drinking and multiplying : with it came the light-
ning-flash which cleared the air and brought fertilisation of mind
and manners. Is it necessary to say that such a theory is
fantastic? The annals of early—and of all—ages show, it is
true, painfully conspicuous the disturbing action of brute force,
but they do not show it alone and solely operative. The picture
of the Eomans as the human bull-dogs of the Mediterranean is
overdrawn. The Roman conquest is not one long roll of unjust
aggressions. Rather in national wars, as in pettier struggles,
right and wrong are mysteriously mixed up; and though the
reason alleged by diplomacy may often be fiction, that may only
be because feeling feels its way through the meshes of motives
which reflection is too slow to analyse. So much for the some-
what fancifully told story of Carneades (p. 59). Indeed, Mr.
Taylor is himself aware that some form of what he calls " moral
survival" is indispensable in every society. In other words, no
society, however rude or violent, could exist if its members
flourished merely because of their physical and intellectual adap-
tation to their medium. In some measure it must answer to
serve the general interest: self-abnegation must be found bene-
ficial by those who practise it. And the first controller of wild
wills was not a mere soldier of force and skill; he was also, in
however small degree, the minister and organ of the common
good.
But Mr. Taylor, omitting this element, proceeds in Carlylesque
mood to note the natural pride in the power of the mighty which
the multitude feel toward their conquerors, and the hero-worship
which greets successful usurpation, at least in the second genera-
tion. An easy descent of imagination turns the rule of force into
the authority of hereditary right: it even goes a step further, and
attributes to the sovereign a charter of power from heaven. Thus
force is gradually covered over by the decorative hand of imagina-
tion, and sovereign might is converted into kingly right,—just as
filial reverence for the commands of parents is the real historic
source out of which has come the ideal sense of duty. And with
regard to all such genealogies, let the ex nihilo nihil fit be remem-
bered: science knows of no development save of the germ into
the full-grown organism, and no variations save variations within
a species. If there is no right in the first might, no lapse of time
will ever confer it, though it may modify and complicate its actual
organisation. Political power is ever a social, not an individual,
fact, even in its origin : it was the perception of this truth which
found expression (unfortunately ambiguous) in the theory of Social
Contract.
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Mr. Taylor sees that force does not originate, but only con-
solidate, exhibit, demonstrate morality, making it a palpable and
real fact. So, too, he should see that law is more than the mere
creation of a political control—more than a mere act of repression.
It may not be without some justification that he protests against
the idea, which seems to lurk in some heads, that customary law
springs up in some mystical mode of growth from a collective
body. Quite true that all initiative must be individual. But it
need not on that account be merely violent. Bather in the
alliance between force and right (neither being in this world at
any stage quite absolute) force in each age cannot create law, but
can only enforce itj. And instead of describing law as "an artificial
device for securing a uniform rate of moral progress " (p. 192) in
a progressive state, whereas in the beginning of social concentra-
tion it was only the command of an " arbitrary power evoked and
sustained by the blind forces of evolution" (p. 197), it seems
truer to say that law is never so artificial as it is represented in
the one passage, nor so casual as in the other; but rather that,
like all human affairs, it exhibits a growing tendency to reason-
able consistency from a point which is no mere zero of intellect
to a terminus which is equally ideal. We know nothing of a man
who was the hopeless sport of natural or ' evolutionary' freak;
nothing of a man who is nature's and evolution's absolute master.
We have not space to follow Mr. Taylor's treatment of the
question of justice. Like many writers before him, he is puzzled
by the apparently fluctuating nature of the conception—by the
contrast between the inner and the outward, the form and
matter, the letter and the spirit of justice. Perhaps a little
reflection will show that there is a like distinction of shell and
kernel in other aspects of virtue. The old question, ' Is virtue
one or many ?' returns in new shapes, and the distinction be-
tween legality and morality is more convenient than fully
defensible. But it is no doubt possible to trace some progress in
the action of the • community as it becomes more and more
organised. The writer of the Fifth Book of the Nicomachean
Ethics distinguished between the mechanism of society for the
purpose of deciding disputes (the method of proportionate equality)
and the disposition or character which aims at avoiding all con-
duct that can cause dispute; and Mr. Taylor imitates him.
What he might have perhaps pointed out more clearly is the
progress of morality which consists, as Plato noted, in its growing
inwardness—in its discovery that its true imperative reads (as
Mr. Stephen says) not ' Do this' or 'Eefrain from that,' but ' Be
thus'. It is however fair to add that Mr. Taylor does give a few
words to the higher stage of morality when the individual is not
a mere mouthpiece of the social fabric (probably he is never quite
so low as that), but is himself an adequate embodiment of the
universal principles of sociality.
Within the shelter of the political unity the family is for the
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first time enabled to pursue its proper functions without being
disturbed by extraneous work, and it comes to be, not .(as the
essayist represents it) a standard to test morality in general, but
the first, nearest and most permanent combination in which
antagonism is partially transmuted. But equally within the
State other associations (Mr. Taylor's "combinations"—he
seems to use "association" for aggregation) become formed and
other aims are pursued. Economic immorality repeats on a
gigantic scale the same unrestrained self-seeking as prevailed in
the pre-association stage : political parties fly each at the other's
throat, and rich and poor stand suspicious and suspected on
different sides of a. great gulf. Within the State, in short, com-
bination is not very moralising : it seeks its own good, and cares
little about others: the only hope of reformation is in individual
agency. The State, in short, has only given us a home to live a
moral life in, and to the individual the mandate rings out—
Spartam nactus, hanc orna.
So with the question of international morality—the morality
from nation to nation. The nation as such is brutally immoral.
Nor is there much hope or cheer in the prospect of a federation
of nations, even if there were any signs of its coming, and not
rather a crowd of portents indicative of the creation of new
nationalities more essentially antagonistic than the old. The
hope here, too, lies in the transformation of the individual into a
being whose cosmic sympathies respond more than ever to the
touch of human nature, as well as to the nearer body of
nationality—into a complete manhood, self-centred because ruled
not by the attractions of a petty clique or isolated aim but
by the better-learnt and better-loved interests of humanity.
But Das Ewig-Weibliche zieht uns hinan. A high place in the
evolution of the moral world is assigned by Mr. Taylor to Woman.
It was genius that first grasped the dim outlines of the great
moral law, and genius that invented the machinery for realising
them. But, while genius has only its day, and then is over,
Woman ministers for ever at the shrine of goodness and righteous-
ness by that spirit of love which is the ultimate dynamic of right
conduct. It would be ungracious to analyse these enthusiasms :
and to inquire into the place of woman in the redemption of the
world from force and fraud is a task which no man can pursue
with an unbiassed or particularly well-informed mind.
Next time we meet Mr. Taylor, we hope he may have widened
his acquaintance with modern systems of thought, which will give
a clearer perspective to his ideas. He might also devote a little
more effort to the lucid expression of them.
W. WALLACE.
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